POTTS vs. PLUNKETT.

RECENT ENGLISH

CASES.

Court of Queen's Bench in Ireland.
POTTS VS. PLUNKETT.'
1. A master is not liable for an injury to a servant occasioned by the breaking of a
flag, where the master's knowledge of the defect in the flag was not alleged.
2. A master is not bound to warrant each servant his safety in the course of his
common employment.
3. The facts must be stated out of which an alleged breach of duty arises.
4. It is not necessary that a plaintiff should negative everything which might constitute a defence, but he must affirm everything which would constitute a liability
on the part of a defendant.

Demurrer.-This action was brought to recover damages for
injuries alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff when in the
employment of defendant. The first count of the summons and
plaint stated, in substance, that the plaintiff had been employed by
the defendant to execute the carpenter-work of a dwelling-house of
the defendait's; that the house was erected under the immediate
inspection and direction of the defendant, without the superintendence of any architect or skilled person in the erection of such
buildings; that the hall-door of the said house was to be approached
by a flight of stone steps, terminating at the top in a landing, which
was to be covered with flags, and to form the roof of an area; that
defendant had selected the flags for said landing, and employed
another person to set those flags; and the flag alleged to have broken
was set in its position by said person according to the directions of
the defendant, and it became necessary and was his duty to take
instructions from the plaintiff; and it was plaintiff's duty, and incident to his said employment as house-carpenter, to give said other
person instructions as to the proper slope of said landing; and that
said other person did require and request plaintiff to give him such
instructions; and to enable plaintiff to give him such instructions,
and for the discharge of plaintiff's duty, and of said other person's
duty, it became and was proper and convenient for plaintiff and
said other person to go to and stand upon said landing which had
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been partially set; and that plaintiff and said other person, in the
execution and discharge of their duty, did go and stand upon said
landing; and plaintiff said that it was defendant's duty to take
reasonable precaution to secure the safety of the plaintiff in the
execution of said business and duty, and that it was defendant's
duty to provide that the flags of said landing should be sufficiently
strong to sustain plaintiff and said other person while engaged in
the performance of their business and duty, and that plaintiff should
not, while so engaged, suffer injury by the insecurity or want of
strength of said flag ; yet plaintiff said that the defendant neglected
his duty, and that one of said flags was, by order of defendant, set
-without any under-support, and that said flag was too thin to be set
with safety, and that said flag was of a bad quality; and defendant
was negligent and wanting in ordinary care and skill in selecting
said flag. And plaintiff said that by reason of such negligence,
carelessness, and want of ordinary skill of the defendant, the said
flag gave way and broke, and plaintiff fell into said area, and sustained great injury. And the plaintiff also complained that the
defendant negligently and improperly placed said flag in so unsafe
and insecure a manner, that while the plaintiff was standing upon
said flag on his necessary and proper business, said flag broke, and
plaintiff was precipitated into the area beneath, and suffered the
injuries complained of in the first count. To this cause of action
the defendant pleaded and demurred together by leave of the court,
that the causes of action in the first and second counts of the summons and plaint were the same, and the injuries of which the plaintiff complained in both counts occurred at the same time and under
the same circumstances ; and defendant said that he used all proper
and necessary care in and about the selecting and laying down of
said flags, and was not guilty of any negligence in relation to the
premises, or any of them. And for a further defence to said causes
of action, defendant said that the injuries complained of occurred
to plaintiff while he was acting as a servant in defendant's employment, and in course of defendant's business. And defendant
averred that he provided for the safety of the plaintiff in the course
of his employment, according to the best of his (defendant's) judg-
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ment, information, and belief; and plaintiff had full opportunity of
seeing the mode and plan adopted for the laying of said flag, and
that same was set without any under-support. And defendant further averred that he did not know that any defect existed in said
flag. Demurrer to the summons and plaint: points of demurrer,,
first, that the summons and plaint did not disclose any cause of action
good in substance, because that the first count of said plaint did not
show or state that defendant had any knowledge of any defect in
the quality of said flag therein alleged to have broken, or that
defendant knew that same was too thin to be placed as in plaint
alleged, or that defendant did not select a fit and proper person to
lay down said flag, or that defendant had any knowledge relative
to the thinness or quality of said flag that was concealed from or
unknown to plaintiff, or that plaintiff did not himself know that said
flag was too thin to be placed or set in the mode in plaint complained
of, or that said flag was of a bad quality, or that plaintiff had not
as full an opportunity of knowing all the facts in relation to the
premises as the defendant had; or that defendant was aware of any
danger or risk to plaintiff by reason of said flag being too thin; or
that defendant was ignorant of, and had no fair opportunity of seeing or knowing all risk or danger to which he was exposed in the
course of his business. Second count; that it is not therein shown
how or in what manner defendant is answerable to the plaintiff for
the negligence alleged on defendant's part, and does not set forth
any state of facts from which it may legally appear that defendant
is liable to answer in damages for alleged negligence. Nor does it
show on what duty or business plaintiff was employed, or what caused
him to be on the premises at the time the accident occurred, or that
plaintiff was on the premises on such business as caused a duty to
devolve on defendant to provide plaintiff's safety, and to make
defendant liable at law for alleged negligence in the second count
stated; and same does not show any privity between plaintiff and
defendant.
.ifurphy (with him Sullivan, Q. C.) for the defendant, in support
of the demurrer. The plaint does not aver that the person employed
to set the flag was not a skilled person; Priestly vs. Fowler, 3 I. &
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W. 1. It is not sufficient in the plaint to say that the defendant
neglected his duty, but the plaintiff must show the facts to the court
6ut of which the duty arises, which is an inference of law: Browne
vs. Mallett, 5 C. B. 598. No help can be had from an allegation
of duty, as unless the facts which are disclosed constitute a ground
of action for breach of duty against the defendant, the duty will
not be implied. The facts here do not support the allegation of
duty. The plaint should have shown that the defendant knew of
the defect in the flag, and the danger of going upon it: Williams
vs. Clough, 3 H. & N. 258. Every declaration since the case of
Priestly vs. owler, contains an averment of the fact that the master knew of the defect in the machinery, and that he had interfered
in the execution of the work, and the ignorance of the fact on the
part of the servant: rose vs. L. and Y. R. Co., 27 L. J. 249;
oberts vs. Smith, 2 Hur. & Nor. 213; Barton vs. Reid, 4 Jur.
769. The declaration should- allege what was the business of the
defendant, and what brought him on the flag at the time : Southcote
vs. Stanley, 25 L. J. 389. The case states, the flag was laid negligently; but does not state the business the plaintiff came on, whether
there in pursuance of the business of the defendant. The declaration should state a privity between the plaintiff and the defendant in
action of tort of this nature, but this does not state a single fact
what was the business of the plaintiff. In Priestly vs. Powler,
the direction of the master and the charge of negligence and carelessness is stated against the master; it must have occurred under
the very eye of the master, and plaintiff must have known the
insecure nature of the cart. There is no averment that an unskilled
person was employed, or that the plaintiff had not sufficient opportunity to see the insecure state of the flag himself.
Thompson, with him Armstrong, Q. 0. The house was built
under the inspection of the party himself, who was not a skilled
person. If a master does not employ a proper person for the performance of any work, then he is liable to an action. In this case
it was averred that defendant himself was the party who performed
the wrongful act; if so, and he provide insufficient securities, knowihg them to be so, then he is liable; it is unnecessary to aver know-

POTTS vs. PLUNKETT.

559

ledge; the presumption is that he ought to know: Hutchinson vs.
Y. N. and B. R. Company, 19 L. J. 266, Ex.; Steele vs. South
.EastBailway Company, 16 0. B. 550; Tarrant vs. Webb, 18 C.
B. 797, 804; Whigmore vs. Jay, 5 Exch. 354; Boberts vs. Smith,
2 Hur. & Nov. 213; Seymour vs. Madden, 16 0. B. 326; Paterson
vs. Wallace, 1 Qu. H. of T. 0. 748; Brydon vs. Stewart, 2 Qu.
H. of L. 0. 30; 1?andelson vs. Murray, 3 Ne. & Per. 239; Dynen
vs. Leach, 26 L. J. 221, Ex.; Bush vs. Steinman, 1 Bos. & Pul.
404; Grote vs. Chester and Hf. R. Co., 2 Exch. 251; Barris vs.
Baker, 4 M. & S. 29; Broom's Legal Maxims, 768; 81st section
C. L. P. A.
I B. Armstrong, Q. 0., same side.-A serious question arises upon
the first paragraph of the declaration, and the want of averments
go to the fundamental principle that if a plaintiff make a prima
facie case, it is not necessary that a declaration should negative
every possible state of facts which might afford &defence- In this
case defendant does not employ a skilful person in the execution
of the work; all the averments admit that it was the duty of the
plaintiff to go on the flag, and that it was necessary in the performance of his duty. The defendant did not exercise ordinary care,
being deficient in skill, and personally superintended the operation
of laying the flag. [LEFRtOY, 0. J.-Does it state that it was at the
instance of the mason that plaintiff went on the flag ?] It avers that
it was proper and convenient for him to be there; submits that cases
cited on the other side are not in point, as the mischief is done in
this case by the master, himself, not, as in cases cited on the other
side, by the acts of a fellow-servant. The matter to be established
.here is negligence, not rashness. There was a duty on the part of
defendant to provide for the sfety of the plaintiff; it was no part of
the plaintiff's duty to examine the state of the flag, and the proper
way to raise that question would be upon the defence. [O'BRIEN,
J.-There is no averment of duty in the summons and plaint, being
there in discharge of duty is quite a different case ; the fact of the
employment being necessary, no knowledge alleged nor liability on
the part of the defendant, the scienter is the gist of the action.]
Sullivan, Q. C., in reply.-The plaintiff was not required by the.
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defendant to go on this flag at all; it was his fellow-servant who
desired him so to do; there is no duty shown by the plaint to have
attached to the master to provide for the safety of his servant; he
could not plead a traverse. [LEFROY,C. J.-The facts which raise
the duty, if pleaded, might be traversed, but not the duty.] Unless
the facts stated raise the duty, it cannot be implied. The master
cannot be held responsible for an injury to his servant, unless the
latter was especially desired by the former to go into the dangerous
position, or in the event of the master knowing of the danger, and
not warning the servant of same ; the scienter should be clearly
alleged. Priestly vs. Fowler, rules this case. It should have been
shown that it was necessary for the plaintiff to have gone on the flag.
LEFioY, 0. J.-In this case we are of opinion that this demurrer
must be allowed. It is quite true, as Mir. Sullivan has said, that
there were a long string of decisions which might be considered to
have decided a new- principle of law in respect to the responsibility
of a master for accidents happening to his servants while in his
employment, distinct from the law as laid down in the case of
Priestly vs. Fowler, where it was laid down that a master was not
responsible for injuries resulting to those in his service from accidents occurring in the course of that employment generally. In
the course of time it came to be considered whether or not that rule
was to be taken without any qualification, and certain qualifications
were added; viz., when the master had been the cause of the injury,
by employing his servants in work, knowing that the machinery by
which they carried on the work could not be safely used for that
purpose, and that its use was accompanied by risk and danger.
That was a very rational qualification; it included the knowledge
of the master. There is also another class of cases which affix a
qualification to the general rule ; viz., where the cause of the injury
or mischief was equally known and palpable to the person employed
as to the master, the servant could not then complain of an accident, for it might be said he went into the work with his eyes open,
VAd he could not be said to have been put to work on a matter of
which he was ignorant that there was risk involved. Then arose
the, case in the H. of L., and if that case was to be held to decide
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all which the learned judges said in the course of the case, it would
appear to have overruled the principle laid down by the case of
Priestly vs. Fowler, and to have established the principle that the
master was bound to warrant the safety of his servant in the course
of their common employment.* Now, that is the very converse of
the case of Priestly vs. Fowler; without, however, saying anything
as to the dicta of the H. of L., we have the Court of Error in
England saying that it was only a dicta; the facts of the case did
not warrant, nor was it necessary to lay down in that case, any
such general proposition; for, upon looking to the case, it appears
that the master was apprised of the danger that all the men in the
mine were subjected to from a stone which was hanging over the
mouth of the pit. This was complained of by the men; but he
treated such complaint with disregard and contempt, and forced
them to go on with their work, with the danger hanging over
their beads; and he was properly held liable for the injury which
resulted in the falling of the stone, by which the death of one of his
servants was caused. He was liable on the principle that he knew
of the danger, but forced on the servants to do the work. That
case furnishes no authority in the present instance, the dicta only
requiring you to make out a case against the master of knowledge
of the danger, and negligence on his part in not guarding, to the
best of his ability, his servants therefrom, without any negligence
on the part of the servants. There is no averment in this plaint
that the defendant knew of any defect in the flag which broke and
occasioned the accident. A plaintiff need not negative everything which may constitute a defence; but he must affirm everything
which would constitute a liability on the part of the defendant. If
the facts show a case in which there was rashness on the part of the
plaintiff, and that there was no necessity for him to expose himself
to the danger by which the accident occurred, even if there was
negligence on the part of the master, he would not be liable. I am
putting the case upon that extreme point, although there is no
necessity for my doing so. There is no averment on the part of
the plaintiff of the knowledge of the defendant, nor any positive
averment of negligence or want of skill on the part of the defendant,
36
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but only that he was negligent by reason of his neglect of duty;
and no facts were stated to constitute a breach of duty on his part.
The facts must be alleged out of which the duty arises; if they are
not averred, they cannot be traversed, since that which is merely
put forward as an inference in point of law only cannot be traversed;
taking, therefore, this case upon the dicta of the House of Lords,
or upon the principles embodied in the decided cases, we think this
demurrer is well founded. We have enough upon this plaint to
show that there was rashness on the part of the plaintiff. There is
nothing in the case to show that it was necessary for the plaintiff
and the mason both to stand upon the flag at the same time, or that
they were directed to stand there by the defendant; and was there
any necessity for them to stand over a pitfall of ten feet deep without examining the state of the flag? E,7ery man has a right to
exercise his own skill and judgment in examining a place about
which he is going to work; and that is more reasonable than that a
master should be held liable for any injury to a man who will not
so exercise his skill and judgment. The plaintiff here does not
aver that he was acting under the direction of the defendant, but by
a round-about way he seeks to imply that the defendant did direct
him; the averment amounts to this merely; that the flag was laid
generally by the defendant's direction, but as to the mode or particulars of the laying he says nothing, but adds that he went upon
it at the request of the other servant, and that it was proper for him
so to do. If that other person was a skillful person in his business,
the master is exonerated. There is no principle to be found to
sustain this plaint, and it would be hard if it could be sustained
when the principle involved is that an employer should warrant
every servant his safety in the course of his common employment;
for these reasons the demurrer must be allowed.
P R~tm, J. concurred.
O'BRIEN, J.-Ooncurring fully in the judgment of my Lord
Chief Justice, I may add, that on looking through the plaint, I find
that it is an allegation of negligence on the defendant's part on
which it is sought to make him liable. What is the negligence ?
It is the position and mode in which the flag was set without sup-

POTTS vs. PLUNKETT.

port; and there is no allegation as to the defendant's desiring it to
be laid without support; nor is there any allegation of its having
been set there for the purpose of a person going upon it; and it
was not necessary for the plaintiff to go on it. The fact of the
defendant's knowledge of the defects should have been averred. I
have been unable to discover a case where there was not an allegation of knowledge on the part of the defendant, except where the
cause of the injury was personally brought home to him.
Demurrer allowed.
Sullivan, attorney for plaintiff.
Littledale, attorney for defendant.

In the Exchequer Chamber, December, 1858.
HOLMES VS. KIDD AND ANOTHER.
An agreement was made between the drawer and acceptor of a bill of exchange, at
the time it was given, that the acceptor should deposit with the drawer some
canvas as a collateral security for the payment of the bill, with power to the
drawer to sell the canvas and apply the money arising therefrom towards the
discharge of the amount of the bill, should it

not be paid at the proper time.

The drawer endorsed the bill after it was overdue, and on nonpayment of the bill
-when due, sold the canvas, and realized part of the amount of the bill:
Held, (affirming the judgment of the Court of Exchequer,) that the agreement
between the drawer and acceptor, as to the canvas, created an equity which
attached to the bill in the hands of the endorsee, who received it after it was
overdue; and, as the drawer, after the endorsement., had sold the canvas, and
retained the proceeds, the endorsee was prevented from recovering on the bill for
so much as the canvas realized on its sale.

This was an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Exchequer
given in favor of the defendants upon demurrer. The declaration
was upon a bill of exchange for £310, drawn by one Watson
upon and accepted by the defendants, and endorsed by Watson to
the plaintiff.
Plea, (there were others),-As to 2721. 2s. 6d., part of the
amount of the bill, that before the endorsement or acceptance of
the said bill, the defendants applied to Watson (the drawer) to
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advance them the sum of 3001., which he agreed to do upon the
terms of defendants, accepting the bill in question, and depositing
with him, among other things, certain canvas of defendants, as a
security for the due payment by defendants of the said bill, Watson to have power of selling the said canvas, and applying the proceeds of such sale in payment of the amount due on the said bill,
if the same should not be paid by defendants, and that the bill was
accepted and the canvas deposited, on the terms as aforesaid; that
after the bill became due Watson sold the canvas, and realized by
such sale 2721. 2,. 6d., and still retained and held the said sum ;
and further, that the bill was endorsed to the plaintiff after it was
overdue, and subject to the proceeds of the equity of the sale of the
canvas being applied to the payment and satisfaction of the bill, and
without any value or consideration being given by the plaintiff for
the said endorsement.
Demurrer to the plea.
The court below held the plea good, and gave judgment for the
defendants.
Atherton, Q. 0., for the appellant, (the plaintiff below.)-This
is the case of an innocent endorsee for value. The drawer had the
option, after the arrangement between him and the acceptor, of
selling the canvas and paying himself the amount of the bill; or
he had the right of endorsing the bill to another. Directly the
drawer endorsed the bill he conferred on the endorsee a perfect
title to it. lHe committed a breach of contract by selling the
canvas afterwards, for which the acceptor might have his remedy
by action, but that does not affect the plaintiff's title to the bill,
though taken overdue, for this contract is not an equity directly
affecting it; the plaintiff hada good title at the time of the endorsement, and there was consideration between the drawer and acceptor.
It might be assumed that the plaintiff knew nothing of the agreement in question. Should this plea be held good, an innocent
endorsee who had a good title to the bill at the time of its endorsement to him will, for the first time, have that title defeated.
Brett, contra, was not called upon.
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ERLE, J.-I
think this is a good plea, and that the judgment of
the court below should be affirmed. An agreement seems to have
been made between the drawer and acceptor of this bill, that the
canvas should be sold by the drawer in the event of the bill being
unpaid at maturity; and the drawer held the bill subject to these
conditions. On the bill not being paid at maturity, he sells the
canvas. It has been asked, is such a sale good, as against the holder
of the bill, and are the proceeds received after it was overdue,
obtained by such sale, a bar to an action on the billpro tanto? I
think they are. The plaintiff took the bill subject to the rights of
the acceptor as against the drawer from whom he bad it. As soon
as the drawer sells the canvas, his rights are defeated pro tanto,
and the same with the holder who took it from him after it was
overdue.

WILLIAM s, J.-I am of the same opinion. The plaintiff took
the bill qualified by the equities with which it was subject when
he received it; and the plaintiff received this bill incumbered
with the equity arising out of the arrangement relating to the
canvas.
CRoPTOpN, J.-The consideration for the acceptance of the bill
in this base, was the agreement that if the canvas was sold on the
bill becoming due and unpaid, the proceeds should be applied
towards its payment. This case is not at all like those of set-off,
such as Burrough vs. Moss, 10 B. & 0., 558, where the set-off
arises out of collateral matter. Here the equities attach directly to
the bill, and what the holder takes from the drawer is in this case
a defeasible title only to the bill in question.

think the plea is an answer to the declaration.
The action is within the ordinary rule of a person taking a bill
overdue ; that it is subject to all the equities attaching to the bill
in the hands of the endorser. This is a bill subject to an incumbrance, for the canvas when sold was to be taken as payment. The
plaintiff took it incumbered with this equity.
WILLES, J., concurred.
Judgment affirmed.
CROWDER, J.-I

